Abstract. On March 2004, Anshel, Anshel, Goldfeld, and Lemieux introduced the Algebraic Eraser scheme for key agreement over an insecure channel. This scheme is based on semidirect products of algebraic structures, and uses a novel hybrid of infinite and finite noncommutative groups. They also introduced the Colored Burau Key Agreement Protocol (CBKAP), a concrete realization of this scheme. We present an efficient method to extract the shared key out of the public information provided by CBKAP, assuming that the keys are chosen with standard distributions.
The Algebraic Eraser scheme
The following scheme was first introduced by Anshel, Anshel, Goldfeld, and Lemieux in the workshop Algebraic Methods in Cryptography held in Dortmund, Germany, on March 2004, and in the special session on Algebraic Cryptography, at the Joint International Meeting of the AMS, DMV, andÖMG, held in Mainz, Germany, on June 2005. It was subsequently published as [1] .
1.1. Notation, terminology, and conventions. Let G be a group acting on a monoid M on the left, and denote the result of an action of g ∈ G on a ∈ M by for all (a, g) ∈ A, (b, h) ∈ B.
1.1.1. Didactic convention. Since the actions are superscripted, we try to minimize the use of subscripts. As a rule, whenever two parties, Alice and Bob, are involved, we try to use for Bob letters which are subsequent to the letters used for Alice (as is suggested by their names).
1.2.
The Algebraic Eraser Key Agreement Scheme.
Public information.
(1) -commuting submonoids A, B of M G, each given in terms of a generating set of size k. (2) Element-wise commuting submonoids C, D of N .
The protocol.
(1) Alice chooses c ∈ C, (a 1 , g 1 ), . . . , (a m , g m ) ∈ A, and sends (cq, h) (a 1 , g 1 ) · · · (a m , g m ) = = (dp, g) (b 1 , h 1 ) · · · (b m , h m ).
We will soon explain why this equality holds.
For the sake of mathematical analysis, it is more convenient to reformulate this protocol as follows. The public information remains the same. Using the notation of Section 1. By Equations (2) and (1) Using this and Equation (3), we see in the same manner that the shared key is (cq, h) (a, g) = (cqϕ( 
, gh) = (dp, g) (b, h).
1.3.
When M is a group. In the concrete examples for the Algebraic Eraser scheme, M is a group [1] . Consequently, M G is also a group, with inversion (a, g) −1 = (
for all (a, g) ∈ M G.
1.4.
Overview and related work. We describe a general attack on the Algebraic Eraser scheme. A concrete realization of this scheme, specified in [1] , is presented below. The attack is always able to recover the shared key out of the public information of this scheme, in less than a second on a standard personal computer. Myasnikov and Ushakov have, independently, discovered a different cryptanalysis of this scheme [16] . They attacked another part of the scheme, using a properly modified length-based attack. Their method is equally successful when the parameters are as recommended in [1] . The analysis supporting their ∆-recovery algorithm breaks down if z is made longer, and indeed they report a decrease in success rates when the length of z is increased. Our attack remains 100% successful when the parameters are increased.
We use methods from probabilistic group theory, which deal with permutation groups, and seems to be the first to introduce these methods into the realm of noncommutative cryptography. These methods have potential beyond the present cryptanalysis. To make our attack applicable to all conceivable larger parameters, about half of the paper is dedicated to a new algorithm for finding short expressions of permutations as words in a given set of randomly chosen permutations. This algorithm solves efficiently instances which are intractable using previously known techniques, and may be of independent interest.
A general attack on the scheme
We will attack a stronger scheme, where only one of the groups A or B is made public. Without loss of generality, we may assume that A is known. A is generated by a given k-element subset. Let  (a 1 , s 1 ) , . . . , (a k , s k ) ∈ M G be the given generators of A. Let S = {s 1 , . . . , s k }. S ±1 denotes the symmetrized generating set {s 1 , . . . , s k , s
2.1. Assumptions.
2.1.1. Distributions and complexity. Alice and Bob make their choices according to certain distributions. Whenever we mention a probability, it is meant with respect to the relevant distribution. All assertions made here must hold "with significant probability" and the generation of elements must be possible within the available computational power. We do not quantify our statements here, but will give exact numbers later. Assumption 1. It is possible to generate, efficiently, an element (α, 1) ∈ A with α = 1.
Assumption 1 is equivalent to the possibility of generating (α, g) ∈ A such that the order o of g in G is smaller than the order of (α, g) in M G. Indeed, in this case (α, g) o is as required.
Assumption 2. N is a subgroup of GL n (F) for some field F and some n.
We do not make any assumption on the field F. It may, for example, be of very large characteristic.
Alice generates an element (a, g) ∈ A, and in particular she generates g in the subgroup of G generated by S. Assumption 3. With significant probability, g can be expressed as a product of a small number of elements of S ±1 .
2.2. The attack.
2.2.1. First phase: Finding d and ϕ(b) up to a scalar. C, D commute element-wise. Use Assumption 1 to get a nontrivial (α, 1) ∈ A. By -commutativity of (α, 1) with (b, h), we have that ϕ(α)ϕ(
, and therefore
where ν 3 = qν 2 q −1 . Now, choose a generic element γ ∈ C. Then
We obtain 2n 2 equations on the n 2 entries of d. As standard distributions were used to generate the keys, we expect that with overwhelming probability, the solution space will be one-dimensional. (As this is a homogeneous equation and the matrices are invertible, the solution space cannot be zero-dimensional.) If it is accidentally not, we can generate more equations in the same manner.
Thus, we have found xd for some unknown scalar x ∈ F. Now use our knowledge of q = dϕ(b) to compute
In summary: We know xd and x −1 ϕ(b), for some unknown scalar x ∈ F.
2.2.2.
Second phase: Generating elements with a prescribed G-coordinate and extracting the key. Let be the minimal such that g ∈ (S ±1 ) . We can find such an expression of g in running time roughly (2k − 1) /2 the following algorithm [13] .
Algorithm 4 (Shortest expression).
( 
and consequently,
Remark 5. The number of free-reduced words (i.e., words without subwords of the form ss −1 or s −1 s) of length in letters from S ±1 is K k, = 2k(2k − 1) −1 . Thus, the running time of Algorithm 4 is roughly K k, /2 , which is roughly (2k − 1) . The space complexity of this algorithm can be reduced to roughly (2k − 1) /4 [7] .
Using Algorithm 4, find i 1 , . . . , i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and 1 , . . . , ∈ {1, −1} such that
α may or may not be equal to a.
Remark 6. Here, we have used the assumption that M is a group (Section 1.3). This is necessary, as in Algorithm 4 we allow negative powers. If the elements of M are not invertible, we have to find a positive expression of g, i.e., where no letter is inverted. In the cases discussed later in this paper, G = S n and the methods of Section 5 can be adjusted to obtain positive expressions (Remark 11).
By -commutativity of (α, g) and
, and thus we can compute
We are now in a position to compute the secret part of the shared key, using Equation (5):
The attack is complete.
Cryptanalysis of CBKAP
Anshel, Anshel, Goldfeld, and Lemieux propose in [1] an efficient concrete realization which they name Colored Burau Key Agreement Protocol (CBKAP). We give the details, and then describe how our cryptanalysis applies in this case.
3.1. CBKAP. CBKAP is the Eraser Key Agreement scheme in the following particular case. Fix n ≥ 7 and a prime number p.
(1) G = S n , the symmetric group on the n symbols {1, . . . , n}. S n acts on GL n (F p (t 1 , . . . , t n )) by permuting the variables {t 1 , . . . , t n }.
by (x 1 , s 1 ), . . . , (x n−1 , s n−1 ), where s i is the transposition (i, i + 1), and
Only the ith row of x i differs from the corresponding row of the identity matrix. The colored Burau group M G is a representation of Artin's braid group B n , determined by mapping each Artin generator
is the group of matrices of the form
with κ ∈ GL n (F p ) a matrix of order p n − 1, and j 1 , . . . , j r ∈ Z.
Commuting subgroups of M G are chosen once, by a trusted party, as follows (the parameters will be set later):
(1) Fix I 1 , I 2 ⊆ {1, . . . , n − 1} such that for all i ∈ I 1 and j ∈ I 2 , |i − j| ≥ 2. |I 1 | and |I 2 | are both ≤ n/2. (2) Define L = σ i : i ∈ I 1 and U = σ j : j ∈ I 2 , subgroups of B n generated by Artin generators. (3) L and U commute element-wise. Add to both groups the central element
, each a product of t-many generators. Transform them into Garside left normal form, and remove all even powers of ∆. Reuse the names w 1 , . . . , w k , v 1 , . . . , v k for the resulting braids. (6) Let ρ : B n → M S n be the colored Burau representation function. A, B are the subgroups of ρ(zLz −1 ), ρ(zU z −1 ) generated by ρ(w 1 ), . . . , ρ(w k ), and by ρ(v 1 ), . . . , ρ(v k ), respectively. (7) w 1 , . . . , w k , v 1 , . . . , v k are made public.
Recall that to carry out our attack, it suffices to assume that just one set of generators is given.
Recommended parameters.
To make the CBKAP fit into small RFID tags, it is recommended in [1] to use the following parameters:
(1) Matrices of size n = 14 or n = 12; (2) t = 10; (3) k = 27 generators for each of the subgroups A, B; (4) m = 14 generators multiplied to obtain the private keys (a, g), (b, h); (5) Field characteristic p = 13; (6) Linear combinations of length r = 3 in equation 8.
3.3. The attack. Assumption 2, that N is a subgroup of GL n (F) for some field F, is a part of the definition of CBKAP. We consider the remaining ones.
In all of our attacks, we used standard distributions, that is: Whenever, in the above descriptions, a product of a fixed number of elements of a set is required, we chose all of the elements independently and uniformly from that set. We then proceeded as instructed (for example, by reducing the powers of ∆ 2 as mentioned above).
3.3.1. Regarding Assumption 1. This assumption amounted to: It is possible to generate, efficiently, an element (α, σ) ∈ A such that the order o of σ is smaller than that of (α, σ).
Using the notation of Section 3.1, {i, i + 1 : i ∈ I 1 } decomposes to a family I of maximal intervals [i, ] = {i, i + 1, . . . , }, and
Each considered s is a permutation induced by the braid
with w ∈ L. Let π : B n → S n be the canonical homomorphism. Then
is conjugate to π(w). On each component, this is a product of many random transpositions, and is therefore an almost uniformly-random permutation on that component. We therefore have the following:
(1) U/ ∆ 2 decomposes into a direct sum of braid groups, whose indices do not sum up to more than n/2. (2) π(U ) decomposes into a direct sum of symmetric groups, whose indices do not sum up to more than n/2.
is generic on each part of the mentioned decomposition.
The probability that the order of a random permutation in S n is ≤ n is O(1/ 4 √ n) [4] . Thus, we can find an element (a, s) ∈ A with s of order ≤ n by generating (roughly 4 √ n) elements (a, s) ∈ A, until the order of s is as required.
On the other hand, the element (a, s) is a representation of an element of the braid group, which is known to be torsion-free [15] . While the representation used here may be unfaithful, 1 it is very unlikely that (a, s) could have finite order.
3.3.2. Regarding Assumption 3. We need to show that with significant probability, s can be expressed as a product of a small number of elements of S ±1 . By the previous discussion, the generators give randomlooking permutations in the group they generate, and as we have many of these, they should span the elements of the group quickly.
Recall that K k, = 2k(2k − 1) −1 is the number of free-reduced words of length in letters from S ±1 . Heuristically, for words of short lengths , we expect small redundancy in the permutations they present, and therefore words of length in {s 1 , . . . , s k } ±1 should present about K k, elements of S n . To have a random element π presented, we need to have K k, ≈ n!. As (2k − 1) < K k, < (2k) , we obtain an estimation for as in the following conjecture.
Conjecture 7. Fix any sequence k n → ∞, and define n = log(n!)/ log(2k n ) . For each n, let s 1 , . . . , s kn and π be independently chosen random elements of S n . Then, with probability 1 − o(1), π can be presented as a word of length ≤ n in the generators {s 1 , . . . , s kn } ±1 .
Proposition 3.2 of [5] gives Conjecture 7 up to a constant factor, when k n is increasing enough quickly. By Proposition 3.3 of [5] , Conjecture 7 does not generalize in the natural way to arbitrary finite groups.
By the discussion of Assumption 1, we are actually working in S n/2 . For n = 16 and k = 27, Conjecture 7 gives an estimation = 3, which is in accordance with the experimental results.
Experimental results.
We have programmed the first phase for many choices of parameters, including parameters 2 much larger than the suggested ones. In hundreds of tests we have performed, we have failed to find a single case were this phase fails.
The second phase was equally successful. For n = 16 (in which CBKAP works inside isomorphic copies of S 8 ), the distribution of the minimal length looks as follows:
Min. length 0 1 2 3 4 ≥ 5 Percentage 0.002% 0.087% 14.951% 84.636% 0.324% 0% In summary, our attack has 100% success rate against parameters with n ≤ 16. In the remaining sections of the paper, we treat a method that extends the presented attack to all n, with the same 100% success rate.
Running time. The attack presented in this section requires solving 2n
2 equations in n 2 variables, and then expressing an element of S n/2 as a short product. The latter task requires roughly n (n/2)! operations, which for small n (say, n ≤ 32) is much smaller than the running time of the first task (roughly n 6 ). Thus, for n ≤ 32 finding the shared key is essentially as fast as solving 2n 2 equations in n 2 variables. This takes less then a second on a standard personal computer.
Larger n
Increasing all of the parameters except for n does not foil the attack presented in the previous sections. However, increasing n substantially does: Conjecture 7 suggests that the running time of Algorithm 4 is roughly n (n/2)!, which is roughly 2 65 for n = 64, and 2 155 for n = 128.
However, for the second phase our attack, there is no need to find a shortest expression of g. Assume that we can afford running time roughly . Then any expression of length would do: Using Equation 2, the actual computations which use the expression can be carried out using many operations, which is very efficient in CBKAP. We arrive at the following problem.
Problem 8 (Group membership search). Given generators g 1 , . . . , g k of a group G and an element g ∈ G, express g as a short product of elements from {g 1 , . . . , g k } ±1 .
In Problem 8, short could mean of polynomial length, or of length manageable by the given computational power as explained above. In any case, the length is the number of letters in the expression, and not the length of a compressed version of the expression. This limitation comes from the intended application, where we actually need to perform one multiplication for each letter in the word. If the word is too long (e.g., of the form a (2 128 ) for a single generator a), this becomes infeasible.
The computer algebra system GAP [8] provides algorithms for the group membership search problem in subgroups of S n . This is done using the following commands on the GAP command prompt, where
H:=Group(L); hom:=EpimorphismFromFreeGroup(H); PreImagesRepresentative(hom,s); GAP uses the celebrated Schreier-Sims algorithm, performing division off a stabilizer chain [17, 11, 9] , together with heuristics similar to those in [14] to shorten the expression. We have tested these algorithms on instances produced by the Algebraic Eraser, for various values of n (having all other parameters set as in the original recommendation). This means that the actual permutations belong to subgroups of isomorphic copies of S n/2 . We have tested about 1000 samples for n ≤ 48. For n = 64, the program ran out of memory in about 5% of the cases, and we have thus conducted only about 300 experiments. The (rounded) results are displayed in Table 1 . This approach is successful only for moderately small values of n. Definitely not for n = 256 (i.e., working in S 128 ) or larger.
Membership search in generic permutation groups
In this section, we introduce a heuristic algorithm solving the group membership search problem (Problem 8) in the case of random generators. Much work was carried out on this topic, by Babai, Beals, Hetyei, Hayes, Kantor, Lubotsky, Seress, and others (see [5, 3, 4] and references therein). Our approach is a heuristic shortcut for some of the ideas presented in these works. It performs surprisingly well on random instances of the problem, but requires some variations in degenerated cases, some of which are treated later.
Problem 9. Given random s 1 , . . . , s k ∈ S n and s ∈ s 1 , . . . , s k , express s as a short product of elements from {s 1 , . . . , s k } ±1 .
makes a more complicated and the computation quickly becomes infeasible. The operation avoids this problem, but does not admit an efficient analogue of squaring.
A classical result of Dixon [6] tells that two random elements of S n , almost always generates A n or S n . (We should expect to obtain A n if all generators are even permutations, and S n otherwise.) Babai proved that getting A n or S n happens in probability 1 − 1/n + O(1/n 2 ) [2] . Moreover, experiments show that this probability is very close to 1 − 1/n even for small n, i.e., the O(1/n 2 ) is negligible also for small n. In particular, the probability that k random permutations do not generate A n or S n is (overestimated by) at most n −k/2 , which is small for large n and negligible for large k.
Given that we obtain A n or S n , the probability of the former case is 2 −k . However, since k = 2 is of classical interest, we do not neglect this case.
Thus, for randomly chosen permutations Problem 9 reduces (with a small loss in probability) to the following one.
Problem 10.
(1) Given random s, s 1 , . . . , s k ∈ A n , express s as a short product of elements from {s 1 , . . . , s k } ±1 . (2) Given random s, s 1 , . . . , s k ∈ S n with some s i / ∈ A n , express s as a short product of elements from {s 1 , . . . , s k } ±1 .
A solution of Problem 10(1) implies a solution of Problem 10(2): Let I = {i : s i / ∈ A n }. I = ∅. Fix i 0 ∈ I, and for each i ∈ I, replace the generator s i with the generator s i 0 s i ∈ A n . Then {s i 0 s i : i ∈ I} ∪ {s i : i / ∈ I} is a set of k nearly random elements of A n (cf. [4] ). If s ∈ A n , use (1) to obtain a short expression of s in terms of the new generators. This gives an expression in the original generators of at most double length. Otherwise, s i 0 s ∈ A n and its expression gives an expression of s in terms of the original generators.
Thus, in principle one may restrict attention to Problem 10(1). However, for optimization reasons, we do not take this approach, since we want to make use of transpositions when we can.
5.1. The algorithm.
Conventions.
(1) During the algorithm's execution, the expressions of some of the computed permutations in terms of the original generators should be stored. We do not write this explicitly. (2) The statement for each τ ∈ S means that the elements of S are considered one at a time, by first considering the elements of S ±1 , then all (free-reduced) products of two elements from S ±1 , etc. (a breadth-first search), until an end statement is encountered.
(3) For s ∈ (S ±1 ) * , len(s) denotes the length of s as a free-reduced word. s is identified in the usual way with the permutation which is the product of the letters in s. (4) For s ∈ S n , deg(s) = |{k : s(k) = k}|. We are now ready to describe the steps of our algorithm. We describe this algorithm without considering optimal values for the parameters and other optimizations. This is left for future investigation. Input: G = S n or A n ; generators s 1 , . . . , s k of G; s ∈ G. Initialization:
Step 1: Find a short c-cycle in s 1 , . . . , s k .
Step 1. The result µ of Step 1 is forwarded to the next step.
Step 2: Find short expressions for additional c-cycles. Case c = 2:
For each τ ∈ s 1 , . . . , s k : π ← τ −1 µτ . If π was not encountered before, store it. If enough 2-cycles were found to present s by a short product of these, end Step 2.
Case c = 3:
For each τ ∈ s 1 , . . . , s k : π ← τ −1 µτ . If π was not encountered before, store it. If enough 3-cycles were found to present σ by a short product of these, End Step 2.
Final step: Find a short expression for s. Present s (or σ) as a product of the found cycles. Use the expressions of these cycles to get an expression of s in terms of the original generators.
Remark 11 (Positive expressions). If s belongs to the monoid generated by {s 1 , . . . , s k }, we can adjust our algorithm to obtain a positive expression of s: Use only Step 1 (many times) to generate enough ccycles to present s, where in this step, consider only words τ ∈ S * . This algorithm is more time consuming and has somewhat smaller success rates, but should still be successful in such scenarios. We do not pursue this direction here, since in CBKAP all involved algebraic objects are groups.
Remark 12 (Applicability to CBKAP). In CBKAP, G typically has the form π −1 Hπ ≤ S n , where π ∈ S n , H is S n/2 or A n/2 , and H is embedded in S n in a natural way (supported by the n/2 higher indices). The conjugation is just relabelling of the indices 1, . . . , n. Thus, the algorithm applies without change to this case either. Modifications of the algorithm can be made, that will make it applicable to any (conjugation of) direct sum of groups of the form A n or S n .
6. Analysis of the generic membership search algorithm 6.1. An idealized model. For the heuristic estimations throughout this section, we make an optimistic assumption, whose consequences we verify experimentally later. This assumption is similar to one which was proved in [4] : For random σ, τ ∈ S n , the lengths of the first cycles of σ, στ, στ 2 , . . . , στ are pairwise nearly independent for ≤ n (7/32−o(1)) log n . It could be that similar methods can be used to prove (a sufficient variant of) our assumption. k }, then all products of two elements from {s 1 , . . . , s k } ±1 (which were not already listed), etc., to generate a sequence of desired length M .
We assume that for some non-negligible positive α ≤ 1 (α may depend on n), the generated sequence contains a subsequence of αM elements, which looks (for the purposes of our analysis) like a sequence of αM random, independently chosen, elements of S n . We call α the density factor for breadth-first search.
Assumption 13 is clearly true when k ≥ M , but we usually apply it in cases where k is much smaller than M . In such cases, the density α cannot be 1, since e.g. the beginning of the sequence s 1 , . . . , s k , s does not look random, even for some of our purposes. For simplicity, we carry out the analysis as if α = 1. This means that actually, the resulting estimations on the required number of listed permutations should be multiplied by α −1 > 1.
6.2.
Step 1. The following terminology and lemma will make the proof of the subsequent theorem shorter. The cycle structure of a permutation s ∈ S n is the sequence (n 1 , n 2 , . . . ) of lengths of cycles of s which are not fixed points. Let σ n (n 1 ,...,n k ) denote the number of elements of S n with cycle structure (n 1 , . . . , n k ).
Proof. First choose the n 1 + · · · + n k elements which will occupy the cycles and consider all their permutations, and then divide out cyclic rotation equivalence, to get
This is clearly equal to σ n (n 1 ,...,n k ) .
Proposition 15. Let c be 2 if G = S n , and 3 if G = A n . For random τ ∈ G, the probability that there is d ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that τ d is a c-cycle is greater than 1/cn.
Proof. In fact, we give better bounds for most values of n. We consider the probabilities to have cycle structures (n − d, c) or (n − d, e, c) for appropriate d, such that if τ has such a cycle structure, then τ n−d is a c-cycle. The restrictions on the cycle structures are as follows.
(1) c does not divide n − d; and (2) e divides n − d (in the case (n − d, e, c) ).
In the case G = A n , we also must have that the cycle structure is possible in A n : (in the case (n − d, e, 3) ).
Assuming these restrictions, we compute the probabilities of these cycle structures using Lemma 14. In S n , the probability for (n − d, 2) is
In A n , the probabilities for (n − d, 3) and (n − d, e, 3) are 1
respectively. We now consider some possible cycle structure, and describe the restrictions they pose on n and their probabilities. Let m = 2 if G = S n , and 6 if G = A n . We write the restriction on n as n mod m.
Group n mod m Cycle structure Prob. Accumulated prob.
This completes the proof.
Corollary 16. Let c be 2 if G = S n , and 3 if G = A n . Execute
Step 1 with random elements τ ∈ G instead of the enumerated ones. The probability that it does not end before considering λn permutations is smaller than e −λ/c .
Proof. By Proposition 15, the probability of not obtaining a c-cycle for λn randomly chosen τ ∈ G is at most
Example 17. Let c be 2 if G = S n , and 3 if G = A n , and λ = cλ 0 log n for some constant λ 0 . Then the probability in Proposition 16 is smaller than e − cλ 0 log n c = n −λ 0 .
Corollary 18. Let c be 2 if G = S n , and 3 if G = A n . Consider
Step 1 in the idealized model. The average number of τ considered in this step is smaller than cn.
6.3.
Step 2. We consider the most simple interpretation for "enough c-cycles were found to present s by a short product": Present s as a product of at most n/(c − 1) c-cycles in some canonical way. Then repeat Step 2 until all these c-cycles were found.
Proposition 19. Execute
Step 2 with random elements τ ∈ G instead of the enumerated ones. Let c = 2 if G = S n , and
The average number of elements considered in this step is smaller than (n c /c) · (log n + 2).
Proof. Each conjugation of a c-cycle by a random permutation gives a random c-cycle. Let σ n c be the number of c-cycles in S n . σ n 2 = n(n − 1)/2, and σ n 2 = n(n − 1)(n − 2)/3. In any case, σ n c < n c /c. To obtain all c-cycles in a prescribed list of k out of N elements, we wait on average: N/k steps to obtain the first element, N/(k − 1) steps to obtain the second element, etc. Now,
where H k < log k + 2 is the kth Harmonic number. In our case, k is the number of c-cycles in a canonical decomposition of a permutation, and thus k < n, and N is the number of c-cycles in S n , and therefore N < n c /c. Thus,
Corollary 20. The average running time of the generic membership search algorithm, in the idealized model, is O(n 3 log n) if G = S n , and O(n 4 log n) if G = A n . Moreover, the constants in these estimations are not big.
Proof. Let c = 2 if G = S n , and 3 if G = A n .
Step 2 consumes most of the time, and requires by Proposition 19 O(n c log n) operations on permutations. Each operation on permutations requires O(n) elementary operations. Together, we have O(n c+1 log n) elementary operations. It is possible to see that the constants are small, by inspection of Step 2.
6.4. The expression's length. Using Corollary 18 and Proposition 19, we can derive a rough upper bound on the average length of the expression provided by the generic membership search algorithm, assuming that reality is not far from the idealized model (we verify this experimentally in the sequel).
By Corollary 18, Step 1 uses on average at most cn permutations until finding a good one τ . If τ is the cn-th permutation in our breadthfirst enumeration of s 1 , . . . , s k , then its length d as a word in the generators satisfies Then, µ is at most an n-th power of τ . Thus on average,
Then, by Proposition 19, about (n c /c) log n permutations τ are generated, and the c-cycles τ −1 µτ are computed. The average length of the generated τ -s is thus estimated by len(τ ) ≤ log((n c /c) log n) log(2k − 1) ≈ c log n log(2k − 1) .
In the last approximation there is less need for precision, since in any case,
Less than n/(c − 1) c-cycles are needed to present the given permutation. Thus, the average length of the resulting expression is bounded by n c − 1
Corollary 21. Assuming that the idealized model is a good approximation to reality, the average length of the expression provided by the algorithm is not much more than
where c = 2 if G = S n , and c = 3 if G = A n .
Example 22. For k = 2 and n = 2 m , the estimation in Corollary 21 is:
up to a multiplicative factor close to 1.
Experimental results
Following are experimental results, which indicate to which extent our idealized model for estimating the performance of the generic membership search algorithm is correct. The most difficult case for this algorithm is where there are only k = 2 random generators s 1 , s 2 . Thus, all of our experiments were conducted for k = 2.
7.1. Assumption 13: The density factor α. We assumed that for random, independently chosen s 1 , . . . , s k ∈ S n , when M elements of s 1 , . . . , s n are generated in a breadth-first manner, the resulting sequence of M elements is as good for our purposes as a sequence of αM random permutations, where α is not very small (though it may depend on n).
For various values of n, and for G = S n or A n , we have calculated the average number of permutations considered in Step 1, in the idealized model (an implementation using random permutations), and in the real model. Table 2 presents the ratio between them, i.e., 1/α, obtained using 100 experiments. We observe that the density α decreases with n, but very slowly. Even for n = 256, the real sequence need only be 12 times longer than the required sequence of independent random permutations.
In the sequel we will see that in the additional place where Assumption 13 was used, the situation is even better: α there is not far from 1/2. In the additional place where Assumption 13 was used, α was not far from 1/2. 7.2. Conventions. For each n = 8, 16, 32, 64, 256, we have 1000 independent experiments altogether. As k = 2, in about 750 of these experiments s 1 , s 2 = S n , and in about 250, s 1 , s 2 = A n . The few cases where neither S n nor A n were generated were ignored.
Each of these many samples suggests a value for the considered parameter. We thus present the minimum, average, and maximum observed values (with the average boldfaced). We do not present the actual values, but rather the ratio between the actual value and the analytic estimation obtained in the previous section. The analytic estimations can be used to obtain the actual numbers. In fact, the ratios are quite good, and thus the analytic estimations are probably good for all values of n.
As usual, in all discussions below c is 2 if G = S n , and 3 if G = A n .
7.3.
Step 1. The ratio between the number of permutations considered in Step 1 and the estimation cn in Corollary 18 is given in Table  3 . Step 2. Table 4 gives the ratio between the number of permutations considered in Step 2, and the estimation (n c /c) · (log n + 2) in Proposition 19. The striking observation is that here, the density factor α improves with n. This is very good, since Step 2 is the most time consuming part in our algorithm. 7.5. Length of the final expression. The average length of the final expression of the given permutation is estimated in Corollary 21 to be, in the idealized model, below
+ 2 . Table 5 shows that this estimation is surprisingly good. The actual lengths of the expressions produced for the given permutations are given in Table 6 . For clarity, the average lengths are rounded to the nearest integer. For comparison, we looked for expressions of permutations as short products, using GAP's optimized Schreier-Sims algorithms. Here, we have 100 experiments for S n and 100 experiments for A n . Already for n = 32, the routines went out of memory in about 1/3 of the cases for A n , and about 2/3 of the cases for S n . Thus, we also checked also n = 24 and n = 28 (n = 28 seems to be the largest index which the routines can handle well). The resulting lengths are shown in Table 7 , where ∞ means "out of memory in too many cases". We can see that Schreier-Sims methods are better than ours only for small values of n. Also, note the large variance in the resulting lengths, despite the fact that they were observed using fewer experiments. Contrast this with the results in Table 6 .
Possible fixes of the Algebraic Eraser and future work
As we have demonstrated, no change in the parameters makes the Algebraic Eraser immune to the attack presented here, as long as the keys are generated by standard distributions.
A possible fix may be to change the group S into one whose elements do not have short expressions in terms of its generators. This may force the attacker to attack the original matrices (whose entries are Laurent polynomials in the variables t i ) directly, using linear algebraic methods similar to the ones presented here. It is not clear to what extent this can be done.
The most promising way to foil our attacks, even on a small fraction of keys, seems to be using very carefully designed distributions, which are far from standard ones. Following our attack, Dorian Goldfeld has found a distribution for which the equations in phase 1 of the attack have a huge number of solutions, and not all of these solutions lead to the correct shared key. This may lead to a system resisting the type of attacks presented here.
Another option would be to work in semigroups, and use noninvertible matrices. This may foil the first phase of our attack.
The generic membership search algorithm is of interest beyond its applicability to the Algebraic Eraser. We have demonstrated, by an idealized analysis backed up by experiments, that this algorithm easily solves instances with random permutations, in groups of index which is intractable when using previously known techniques. The most interesting direction of extending the present work seems to be a rigorous analysis, in the real model, of this algorithm. Alexander Hulpke has informed us that our algorithm looks a bit like methods used for constructive recognition of S n or A n . This connection may be useful for the proposed analysis.
Of practical interest may be a careful examination of some of the directions in which the generic membership search algorithm can be optimized, or extending it to larger classes of problem instances without substantially degrading its performance. Even without changes, we know that the algorithm applies in cases not treated here, as experiments of the full attack succeeded in all cases, including ones where the index of the generated subgroup of S n/2 was greater than 2.
